I checked out Isaac's Storm from the library a few weeks ago. After reading and enjoying The Splendid and The Vile, I heard from a few family members that they had particularly enjoyed Erik Larson's earlier historical narrative about the great hurricane of 1900, which devastated the city of Galveston TX.
In between me checking out that book and actually starting to read it, the country has suffered another two historically painful hurricanes, Helene and Milton. While I haven't followed those storms super-closely, there's plenty of news of the devastation and anguish they have caused, and some of that contemporary news was fresh in my mind while reading this. Helene in particular felt kind of similar in the almost unbelievable way it unfolded: nobody had thought that a hurricane could strike the coast of Texas before it did, and nobody imagined that a hurricane could cause such devastation deep in inland North Carolina before it arrived.
As with his other books, Erik Larson writes in a novelistic style with characters, plots, dialogues and tension, but 100% backed by historical data. Every time a character "speaks" in the book, it's based on a contemporary recording. All of their movements and actions are based on data (when necessarily qualified with a "perhaps" or "maybe").
The primary character here is the titular Isaac Cline. A station chief for the nascent Weather Bureau positioned in Galveston, Isaac is uniquely positioned for a perspective on the storm: he's plugged into the Bureau bureaucracy, the science, the Galveston geography, culture, and so on. As with The Splendid and the Vile, though, there's a wide range of "supporting characters" filling the novel as well. One of the most poignant is Joseph, Isaac's younger brother. Joseph and a few other characters reappear thoughout the book, while others may only appear in a single scene.
After a dramatic opening, the book rewinds to the formation of the Weather Bureau and gradually progresses forward to 1900. Pretty much everything here was brand-new information for me. The Bureau started as a wing of the military, which wanted to systematize the gathering and reporting of weather information. Of course this is hugely important for warfare - as is demonstrated in a later meeting, a single hurricane can destroy more warships than enemy cannons, and being able to predict even a few hours out whether it will be rainy or sunny can have a huge impact on the decision to launch an infantry assault.
Isaac grew up in a tiny rural farming community, went to college, and was plucked to join the Bureau; but because it was a military operation, he also needed to practice swordsmanship, horseback riding, and other basic training of the day. A big part of this was signalling, the ancient art of communicating over long distances through flags, smoke fires, mirrors and so on. This wasn't used in practice, thanks to the relatively recent development and spread of the telegraph. Larson notes that prior to the telegraph there wouldn't have been any way for the Weather Bureau to function: it relied on near-instantaneous communication across a vast amount of space, collecting data in near real-time to get a better understanding of what systems were active and how they were moving. As with most books I read these days, I was reminded of William Bernstein, particularly The Birth of Plenty and its argument that the creation of the telegraph was the final pre-requisite for creating the modern economy.
I was a little surprised at first to learn that the modern National Weather Service started as a creation of the military, but in retrospect it makes a lot of sense. More recently, the Internet, GPS, Roombas and many other things were directly spawned by US military research and development, before spinning off and creating enormous civilian benefits.
It was cool to read about the start of weather forecasting as a science. I've recently been thinking about the origin of psychology and psychiatry. Prior to Freud, the mind was generally thought of as belonging to the religious/spiritual domain, something to discuss with your priest and not with a doctor or scientist. Like many founders of new sciences, Freud was wrong about most of the stuff he wrote about, and he promulgated some specific ideas that caused harm for multiple generations until they were eventually disproved and unwound. But Freud does deserve credit for creating a system around the mind, treating it as something that can be analyzed, experimented on and understood.
It's surprising how similar weather is. Isaac's Storm describes that many people thought it was blasphemous to attempt to predict the weather, because God creates the weather and only He knows what will happen. Much like Freud, the early Weather Bureau was almost comically bad at making forecasts: predicting clear skies immediately before enormous snowfalls, predicting warm weather right before steep freezes. But during this time they were systematically gathering data, refining their techniques and eventually learning from their mistakes and turning into the much more trustworthy National Weather Service we have today.
The NWS still isn't perfectly accurate, of course, as the two recent hurricanes demonstrate. But a huge and important change between 1900 and 2024 has been the embracing of humility. At the time of Isaac's Storm, it was official policy to deny any errors and spin misses into successes. Larson notes in the Afterword that today forecasters are far more willing to admit what they don't know. There's a high level of awareness that things can happen which have never happened before (like massive flooding in the mountains of North Carolina). Acknowledging these limits leads to some more couching, but also far more trust.
The storm itself is highly dramatic, but the human element was even more striking to me: the hubris and arrogance that not only kept people from preparing for the storm, but even know that it was coming. The most infuriating aspect is rooted around imperialism and racism: meteorologists on Cuba had spent several decades developing a very advanced forecasting tradition, drawing on the long knowledge of enduring Caribbean storms and recent scientific advancements. The Weather Bureau was also present on Cuba, and pooh-poohed the idea that the Cubans could predict better than them: they saw Cubans as ignorant superstitious barbarians. Their rivalry grew so intense that the Bureau actually blocked any telegraphs from leaving Cuba without first going through them, and they censored any predictions they didn't agree with. The Cubans correctly recognized that the storm was continuing west and would hit Texas, while the Bureau clung to their prior assumption that hurricanes invariably turn north and would enter through Florida. Even days after the disaster, the Bureau brass refused to recognize that the hurricane which devastated Galveston was the same one that had passed through Cuba days before.
There are of course many examples in human history of mankind turning a tragedy into a catastrophe, but the one that first comes to my mind is Chernobyl, as depicted in the excellent recent HBO miniseries. There as here, powerful natural forces cause the direct damage, but it is human arrogance, stubbornness, and clinging to bureaucracy that makes the situation far worse. The good news is that, in both cases, we can find ways to improve our systems: allowing for dissent, making hierarchies less rigid, being able to at least recognize the possibility of black swan events.
Most of what I've written about here has to do with the Bureau and stuff, which honestly interested me the most, but there's a lot of great personal drama in this book as well. Joseph Cline emerges as possibly the most poignant character of the book. When he's first introduced, I thought of him as the "lesser brother", and imagined him consumed by bitterness and jealousy of his more successful older brother; but by the end of the book he comes across as by far the more admirable brother: more honest, less self-aggrandizing, very brave.
I loved the rivalry between Galveston and Houston. I think that's one of those things that's hard for us to really appreciate from our modern standpoint: knowing how things end, it's hard to take Galveston seriously as a contender, but Larson does a great job at portraying just how optimistic city leaders were about their future destiny. That's another thing that felt uniquely turn-of-the-century, the kind of civic boosterism that seemingly prevailed everywhere west of the Appalachians. While Houston makes very few direct appearances here, each specific one is loaded with significance. The book ends with the discovery of the Spindletop gusher and the massive wealth that subsequently flowed to Houston and Texas; this lines up in some ways with Chernow's biography of Rockefeller, which likewise pays very little attention to Texas other than noting how oddly long it took for anyone to discover significant oil reserves outside of western Pennsylvania.
Near the end of the book, while the storm ravages Galveston, we see some really macabre scenes. One of the most affecting describes how, as the storm was growing more intense, the nuns at an orphanage attempted to protect the children by collecting them in groups and connecting them together with a rope line, keeping anyone from getting lost. After the storm passed, a rescuer found a dead child on the beach, and when attempting to retrieve the body, dragged up another dozen bodies and a nun's. The rope that was meant to protect them all ended up dooming them all.
Anecdotes like that help communicate the gravity of the destruction. Reading the death toll numbers sounds bad - early reports put it at a few hundred, then over a thousand, and eventually as many as 10,000. But personally I have a hard time emotionally connecting to a raw statistic: 100, 1000, 10000 deaths all sound bad. Having those personal stories really helps humanize the particular losses, which you can then extrapolate out to the scale of the suffering.
So, yeah! Not the most cheerful book I've read, but a really compelling and shockingly readable one. I finished almost the entire book in a single day, which is almost unheard of for me: I'll typically plug away at something over a week or more during transit rides and occasional evenings, but this particular one I picked up on a Saturday morning and had almost finished by the time I went to bed. Larson is a terrific writer, taking an incident I was barely aware of, illuminating it, placing it in the historical context and drawing some really great lessons from it.
Glad you got a chance to read Isaac's Storm. A ton to unpack, and the number one book I recommend to people in my current profession. There were a lot of 'firsts' in the field that Larson captures, and lessons learned that we are still re-learning (the donation of all left shoes makes people shake heads to this day, because donations management remains a challenge).
ReplyDeleteOne comment in post stood out to me, and I'd like to dissect: "nobody had thought that a hurricane could strike the coast of Texas before it did, and nobody imagined that a hurricane could cause such devastation deep in inland North Carolina before it arrived."
Actually, as you pointed out a little later, Cuba not only knew hurricanes could track that path, they tried to warn about that specific storm. I'm trying to recall if Larson mentions it, but the local tribes also had stories on historical storms in the region. However, political and short term economic considerations outweighed any naysayers. One of the tragic aspects that Larson captures so well is how Isaac for years was one of the chief prophets on the "Galveston is blessed" side.
Similarly, modern Emergency Management has been messaging for decades about the threats of inland flooding as the tropical storm remnants can cause devastation. They've attempted to convince communities to move from areas that are at high risk for flash flooding, and in recent years have been rolling out training for local EM because of the realization that the storms are getting worse (slower and wetter) and the communities are less prepared.
However, politics and money once again stand in the way.
Oh, great note! When I said "nobody had thought" I really meant "the general public didn't think", which is very very different! Thanks for the reminder about the delay between experts recognizing a thing and local people actually being ready for the thing - as you note, politics and money are often our bane.
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